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Article

The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils
of Ad Hoc Balancing
Jules Lobel†
The Bush administration’s response to the September 11
attacks has been characterized by a paradigm shift in fighting
terrorism: from a defensive to offensive strategy, from reliance
on deterrence to a new emphasis on preemption, from backward to forward-looking measures, and from prosecution to
prevention.1 At the heart of this shift is what Attorney General
John Ashcroft termed the “new . . . paradigm of prevention.”2
The Bush administration has invoked this sweeping new preventive paradigm to justify the coercive use of state power to
preventively detain suspected terrorists, to engage in extraordinary rendition of suspects to foreign states, to interrogate detainees, and to go to war against Iraq.3 While the traditional
rules of both international and domestic law prevent a state
from using physical force against an individual or another nation except in response to some demonstrable wrongdoing, the

† Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh Law School. This Article
draws upon a larger book project, co-authored with Professor David Cole, entitled Less Safe, Less Free: The Failure of Preemption in the War on Terror
(forthcoming New Press 2007). Any mistakes or errors are, of course, my own,
as are any views expressed in this Article. I wish to thank my research assistant Sarah Vuong for her research help with this Article and the staff of the
Document Technology Center at the University of Pittsburgh for their invaluable assistance in preparing this Article. Copyright © 2007 by Jules Lobel.
1. DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE: THE FAILURE OF
PREEMPTION IN THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming New Press 2007) (manuscript at 1, on file with authors).
2. John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., Prepared Remarks Before the
Council on Foreign Relations (Feb. 10, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj
.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2003/021003agcouncilonforeignrelation.htm (“In order to fight and to defeat terrorism, the Department of Justice has added a
new paradigm to that of prosecution—a paradigm of prevention.”).
3. See infra Part I.
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new preventive paradigm allows the state to use such coercive
power to prevent possible wrongdoing in the future.4
The shift to prevention has shaped the administration’s response to terrorism in a wide variety of domestic and international contexts. Domestically, the Justice Department now
views the prevention of future terrorist acts as “even ‘more important than prosecution’ [of] past crimes.”5 Similarly, in foreign policy, the National Security Strategy announced a “new
doctrine called preemption,”6 which states that we are living in
a “new world”7 where the U.S. “can no longer solely rely on a
reactive posture as . . . in the past.”8 The National Security
Strategy maintained that in order to prevent a future attack,
the United States could initiate warfare unilaterally even when
it neither had been attacked nor faced a threat of imminent attack.9 In the name of preventing future attacks, the administration detained thousands of individuals without trial, the
vast majority of whom were never even charged with committing a terrorist crime.10 The administration has justified its use
of coercive interrogation tactics against detainees and its establishment of secret CIA prisons, which house allegedly highvalue al Qaeda suspects, by asserting the necessity of preventing future terrorist attacks.11 The administration has transformed the practice of extraordinary rendition from a mechanism used to transfer accused criminals to a country where
they would face trial to a preventive technique whereby suspects are sent to third countries not to try them for crimes they
allegedly committed, but to torture and preventively detain
them without charge in order to obtain information to prevent
future crimes.12
4. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5).
5. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS
3 (2006) (quoting Curt Anderson, Ashcroft Cites “Monumental Progress” in
U.S. War on Terrorism, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 13, 2003).
6. Remarks at a Reception for Governor Rick Perry of Texas in Houston,
1 PUB. PAPERS 990, 994 (June 14, 2002).
7. George W. Bush, Introduction to WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
8. Id. at 15.
9. Id.
10. David Cole, Are We Safer?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 9, 2006, at 15, 17.
11. Id.
12. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely
Send Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, § 1, at 1 (“[Rendition is the]
Bush administration’s secret program to transfer suspected terrorists to for-

LOBEL_4FMT

2007]

6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM

PREVENTIVE PARADIGM

1409

The adoption of this preventive model in both domestic and
foreign affairs is closely linked to the President’s assertion of
inherent executive power and to the executive branch’s reliance
on military force and war powers to fight its war on terror.
Critics of the Bush administration have argued that the administration has asserted unprecedented views of unchecked,
inherent executive authority to fight terrorism, and these critics have claimed that the expansion of executive power underlies the war on terror.13 Few, however, have noted the close relationship between the administration’s expansive view of
executive power and its adoption of a coercive preventive paradigm. Yet, the Bush administration justifies its assertion of
sweeping executive authority by claiming the need to use coercive preventive strategies. Indeed, immediately after September 11, top White House lawyers agreed “‘that [the administration] had to move from retribution and punishment to
preemption and prevention. Only a warfare model allows that
approach.’”14
The turn toward prevention is not surprising. When faced
with potential terrorist threats, it makes sense to focus efforts
on preventing future attacks, as opposed to merely punishing
those who have attacked the United States. Preventive diplomatic, law enforcement, and security measures are crucial to
U.S. security, just as preventive medicine is important to one’s
physical wellbeing. What is problematic about the administration’s preventive paradigm is not its preventive focus, but the
state’s reliance on the preventive use of physical force against
individuals or nations in circumstances where traditional law
normally prohibits such use. Instead of focusing on preventive
measures like increased port security or monitoring terrorist
funding, both of which have been underfunded by this administration,15 the executive has emphasized coercive prevention. In
pursuit of this aim, the administration has deployed physical
and military force to detain suspected terrorists, to kidnap and
send individuals to nations that will detain and likely torture
them, to engage in coercive interrogations, and to go to war
eign countries for interrogation . . . .”).
13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN
WARTIME 554 (2004).
14. Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44, 51
(quoting Associate White House Counsel Bradford Berenson).
15. Mathew Brzezinski, Red Alert, MOTHER JONES, Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 39,
94.
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against nations that it believes pose a future threat.16 Of
course, a state may use force against individuals or other nations in circumstances narrowly prescribed by the rule of law.17
A function of the preventive paradigm is to nullify those proscriptions in the name of prevention.
The preventive paradigm was making disturbing inroads
into traditional notions of preventing harmful conduct even
prior to September 11. Some scholars have argued that democratic societies are experiencing a basic shift in their approach
to controlling harmful behavior, moving from a traditional reliance on deterrence and backward-looking reactions toward a
more preventive and forward-looking approach.18 Professor
Paul Robinson has observed that over the past few decades, the
criminal justice system’s focus has shifted from punishing past
violations to preventing future crimes by means of a system of
preventive detention.19 Americans’ increased fear of crime has
made the criminal justice system more receptive to the preventive rationale.20 September 11 dramatically escalated Americans’ fears and insecurities, leading to greater acceptance of the
preventive rationale in the war on terror.
The Bush administration’s argument for the adoption of a
new preventive paradigm is based on the threat of a potentially
catastrophic attack.21 In a variety of settings, the administration and its supporters pose worst-case hypotheticals to justify
highly coercive preventive measures. For example, they often
invoke the ticking bomb scenario to justify preventive torture;
they argue that if a suspect is known to have planted a bomb in
a building, the only way to prevent thousands of people being
killed is to torture the suspect. So too, in the run up to the preventive war against Iraq, President Bush invoked the specter of
nuclear attack: “America must not ignore the threat gathering
against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for
the final proof, the smoking gun, that could come in the form of
16. See infra Part I.
17. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42, 51.
18. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 2.
19. Paul Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detentions as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429
(2001).
20. See id. at 1433–34 (“[P]olitical forces inevitably will press for protective measures if a perception of public vulnerability exists . . . . [I]t is understandable that today’s citizens are demanding greater protection and that legislators are seeking new ways to provide it.”).
21. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 13.
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a mushroom cloud.”22 And when administration supporters argue in favor of preventive detention, they ask what the government should do when it captures a person known to be
planning a terrorist attack when that knowledge is based on
solid, reliable evidence that cannot be disclosed.
The preventive paradigm is thus premised on an emergency situation which purportedly requires modifying or discarding the normal rules of law. These preventive measures are
grounded in a claim that when the potential risks are catastrophic the normal cost-benefit calculations of law do not apply.23
Hence, while in ordinary times society generally accepts that it
is preferable to let ten guilty persons go free than to convict one
innocent person, some suggest that we cannot sustain that balance when the risk is that one of the ten who go free will get his
hands on a weapon of mass destruction.24
Preventive paradigm advocates therefore suggest replacing
the clear rules of law applicable in normal times with a more ad
hoc balancing approach attuned to the exigencies of emergencies, in which officials may undertake preventive action when
such action is deemed the “lesser evil” because it is necessary to
avoid catastrophic harm.25 As Professor Ruth Wedgwood
stated:
We tolerate multiple acts of individual and social violence as the cost
of safeguarding our privacy and liberty, demanding that the government meet an extraordinary standard of proof before it can claim any
power over our person, acting with a retrospective rather than anticipatory glance. But now the stakes seem different. . . . The deliberate
temperance and incompleteness of criminal law enforcement seem inadequate to the emergency, when the threat to innocent life was multiplied by orders of magnitude.26

Resorting to coercive preventive measures when threatened with an emergency of potentially catastrophic proportion
is not, of course, confined to the current Bush administration.
The United States has often turned to preventive measures in
times of war or national emergency. The post-World War I

22. Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1751, 1754, (Oct. 7, 2002).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 25–34.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 25–26.
25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 34 (2006); John Yoo, Using Force, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 751–61 (2004).
26. Ruth Wedgwood, The Law’s Response to September 11, 16 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. J. 8, 9 (2002).
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Palmer raids and the World War II internment of over 100,000
Japanese Americans are two of the more infamous twentieth
century examples of governmental deployment of coercive preventive measures in perceived times of crisis.27 The country’s
first war with a European power after the Constitution’s ratification, the undeclared war with France in the late 1790s, led
Congress to enact the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 authorizing the President to deport aliens who had not committed any
crime but were judged to be “dangerous to the peace and safety
of the United States.”28 Some historians have characterized
southern secession and the attack on Fort Sumter, which
brought on the Civil War, as forceful preventive measures
taken to forestall the Northern Republicans gathering threat to
the system of slavery.29 Other nations such as Great Britain,30
Israel,31 and India32 have a long history of using preventive detention in response to a perceived crisis. Preventive war in response to a looming crisis has a long and generally sordid history in Europe.33
Perceived emergencies are thus likely to provoke coercive
preventive responses. Because preventive measures are so
closely linked to emergencies, there is an inherent tension between such measures and the rule of law. Countries undertake
these preventive measures because of perceived necessity, and
as Oliver Cromwell once pithily put it, “Necessity hath no

27. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 989–97 (2002).
28. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570–71 (1798) (expired
1800) (“[I]t shall be lawful for the President of the United States at any time
during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as he shall judge
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States . . . to depart out of the
territory of the United States . . . .”); see also Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat.
577 (1798) (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000)); Sedition Act, ch. 74,
1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired 1801).
29. James M. McPherson, The Fruits of Preventive War, PERSPECTIVES,
May 2003, at 5, 5.
30. Cornelius P. Cotter, Emergency Detention in Wartime: The British Experience, 6 STAN. L. REV. 238, 238 (1954).
31. AMNESTY INT’L, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION: DESPAIR, UNCERTAINTY AND LACK OF DUE PROCESS 2
(1997), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/MDE150031997ENGLISH/
$File/MDE1500397.pdf; Alan Dershowitz, Preventive Detention of Citizens During a National Emergency—A Comparison Between Israel and the United
States, 1 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 295, 309 (1971).
32. Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, Emergency Rule in India, 36 PAC. AFF. 221,
225 (1963).
33. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 189).
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law.”34 The coercive preventive paradigm substitutes ad hoc
balancing for the relatively clear rules designed to limit executive discretion.
This Article will address the claim that times of crisis require jettisoning legal rules in favor of ad hoc balancing. Part I
will demonstrate that the coercive preventive measures
adopted by the Bush administration discard clear legal rules in
favor of ad hoc balancing and rely on suspicions rather than objective evidence. Part II will examine the claims of prevention
paradigm supporters that ad hoc balancing is necessary in the
new post-9/11 era in order to reach decisions that correctly
weigh the values of liberty and peace versus national security.
This Article will argue that discarding the legal rules that prevent or limit the application of coercive preventive measures in
favor of an ad hoc balancing test not only undermines law and
liberty, but fails to protect our security.
I. COERCIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES, THE RULE OF
LAW, AND AD HOC BALANCING
The constellation of tactics that form a core of the administration’s new preventive paradigm—detaining individuals who
are believed to pose dangerous threats, rendering suspects to
third countries where they are likely to be indefinitely detained
and tortured, engaging in “preventive” torture or inhumane
treatment in order to obtain information to prevent future terrorist actions, and initiating war to prevent a nation from eventually either attacking us or transferring weapons to terrorists
who will use them against us—all have common elements.
Each substitutes ad hoc balancing for clear rules, makes judgments based on suspicions and not hard evidence, and discards
legal checks on unilateral decision making. These elements
sacrifice integral components of what democratic nations have
come to accept as the rule of law in the name of national security.
A. SUBSTITUTING OPEN-ENDED STANDARDS FOR CLEAR RULES
Democratic societies have sought to restrain the use of
state violence against fundamental human interests by means
34. Max Radin, Martial Law and the State of Siege, 30 CAL. L. REV. 634,
640 (1942) (quoting Oliver Cromwell, Speech to Parliament (Sept. 12, 1654), in
5 THOMAS CARLYLE, OLIVER CROMWELL’S LETTERS AND SPEECHES WITH ELUCIDATIONS 74 (1870)).
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of clear, bright-line rules. The government may not incarcerate
a person for violating vague rules, nor can it deny her freedom
of speech based on an open-ended ad hoc balancing test. The
prohibition on torture and cruel and inhumane treatment is
absolute.35 International law has also sought to protect international peace and national self-determination by setting forth a
bright-line rule against non-defensive use of force.36
The preventive paradigm favors open-ended standards and
ad hoc balancing over clear rules. When the government acts
preventively it requires flexibility and discretion, and it seeks
to avoid being hemmed in by clear strictures. Moreover, government actions that are based on predictions or suspicions
about future conduct are inherently less subject to clear rules
than those based on evidence of what has already occurred.37
Since the government asserts that coercive preventive action is
required by necessity, the typical formula weighs the magnitude of the harm the government seeks to avoid versus the
probability that the government’s action will avoid such
harm—both of which are imponderables undefined by any clear
rule.38
For some, the essence of law is rules. To Justice Scalia, “a
government of laws means a government of rules,” and a decision “ungoverned by rule” is “hence ungoverned by law.”39 To be
sure, despite Scalia’s formulation, the law frequently employs
open-ended balancing tests and speculative cost-benefit assessments. Courts or governmental agencies frequently utilize
cost-benefit analyses to determine which acts constitute negligence or how stringent environmental and occupational safety
regulations should be.40 And the Supreme Court has often relied on balancing tests to resolve issues such as the validity of
state laws that impinge on interstate commerce.41 But such decisions are fundamentally different from decisions to attack another nation, to incarcerate an individual indefinitely, or to
employ coercive interrogation. Domestic and international law
35. See infra notes 42, 65 and accompanying text.
36. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42, 51.
37. See COLE & LOBEL, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5–6).
38. Yoo, supra note 25, at 751–61.
39. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
107 (1983); Thompson v. Hirano Tecseed Co., 456 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir.
2006); Pennington v. Holiday Ret. Corp., 100 F. App’x 301, 302 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429,
434 (2005); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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recognize that the more fundamental the human interests at
stake, the less appropriate are flexible, open-ended balancing
tests. The prohibitions on torture, cruel and inhumane treatment, genocide, and summary executions are absolute.42 Similarly, because of the importance of the interests protected by
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has rejected a balancing approach for the regulation of subversive speech. In the
1950s, the Court had employed such a test, holding that the
gravity of the threat of communist revolution was sufficiently
great that even a small probability that it might come to fruition was sufficient to justify the punishment of speech advocating communism.43 Ensuing abuse under that standard, however, ultimately led the Court to articulate a bright-line rule
prohibiting the suppression of speech that advocates crime
unless the state can demonstrate that the speaker intends to
cause violence and that such violence is in fact likely and imminent.44
The government’s use of non-coercive preventive measures
is typically a discretionary policy decision ungoverned by a
clear rule. Whether to deploy new detection equipment at airports or seaports, how many visas to issue to foreign students,
or whether to undertake diplomatic initiatives designed to
make it more difficult for terrorists to obtain chemical or nuclear weapons are all determinations best left to political discretion. But when the state employs force against individuals
or other nations, clear rules are an important legal mechanism
to prevent abuses that inevitably arise from the exercise of discretion.
The tension between clear rules and coercive preventive
strategies is illustrated by the preventive war doctrine articulated by the administration in its National Security Strategy
and applied to justify the invasion of Iraq.45 The terrible destructiveness of modern warfare led the world’s leaders to conclude that individual nations’ use of force should not be left to
the political discretion of national leaders using vague balanc-

42. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec.
16, 1966, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 81-15, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
43. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501–11 (1951).
44. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969).
45. See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 5–6.
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ing tests.46 These leaders concluded that they needed a clear
rule to restrain the resort to war—a rule that prohibited nations’ use of force except in narrowly defined circumstances.47
Just as legal protection for speech calls for bright-line rules
limiting political discretion, the UN Charter articulates a clear
rule that individual nations may not unilaterally decide to use
force except in self-defense in response to an armed attack.48
Customary international law broadens that self-defense exception somewhat to allow the use of force in response to imminent
attacks.49
The principle that individual nations may unilaterally use
military force against other nations only in self-defense is designed to discourage resort to war by creating a bright-line legal rule. An armed attack is an objective fact; an imminent attack involves some amount of prediction, but generally requires
objective evidence that the attack is indeed imminent, such as
the massing of troops at the border. As Secretary of State
Daniel Webster stated in 1842, self-defense is permitted under
customary international law only where the threat is “‘instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment
of deliberation.’”50 The Pentagon’s definition of a permissible
“preemptive attack” undertaken in self-defense echoed Webster’s: “an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent.”51
The new preventive war doctrine departs from this brightline rule and substitutes a much more open-ended and less objectively verifiable standard. Not a single administration official argued that Iraq had plans of an imminent attack against
the United States or anybody else. Rather, the administration’s
claims were based on a calculation of inevitability or probability. For example, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
46. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 136–37 (2d ed. 1979).
47. See id.
48. U.N. Charter art. 51.
49. Michael N. Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24
MICH. J. INT’L L. 513, 518, 535 (2003).
50. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Alexander Baring,
Lord Ashburton, British Plenipotentiary (Aug. 6, 1842), in 2 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412, 412 (1906) (quoting Letter
from Daniel Webster, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Henry Fox, British Minister in
Wash. (Apr. 24, 1841)).
51. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED
TERMS 418 (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/
04196.html. (emphasis added).
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asserted that rogue states’ “‘unrelenting drive to possess weapons of mass destruction brings about the inevitability that they
will be used against [the United States] or [United States] interests.’”52
The decision to launch a preventive war invariably involves
speculation about future events and intentions, which is a
judgment that defies clear rules. Thus, the National Security
Strategy replaces the clear legal rule of self-defense with a
vague and necessarily speculative balancing test in which the
greater the threat, the less certainty there needs to be about
the probability of the risk eventuating.53 The administration
makes no attempt to define when a threat is sufficient to justify
the use of force.54 As former administration official John Yoo
recognized, the preventive war doctrine is based upon a flexible
cost-benefit standard rather than the clear rule contained in
the UN Charter.55
The open-ended standard of the preventive war doctrine
eviscerates the notion of legal rules controlling warfare, a point
perhaps best described by Abram Chayes, the legal advisor to
the State Department during the Cuban missile crisis.56 In explaining why the Kennedy administration refused to rely on
preventive self-defense to justify its actions, Chayes accepted
that the notion of self-defense included an anticipatory response to an imminent attack.57 But to permit preventive selfdefense where there is no threatened imminent attack, he
maintained, would mean that “[t]here is simply no standard
against which this decision could be judged. Whenever a nation
believed that interests, which in the heat and pressure of a crisis it is prepared to characterize as vital, were threatened, its
use of force in response would become permissible.”58 Because
such a doctrine would destroy any clear limits on the use of
force, Chayes argued that it would amount to a concession that
“‘law simply does not deal with such questions of ultimate
power.’”59
52. JEFFREY RECORD, DARK VICTORY: AMERICA’S SECOND WAR AGAINST
IRAQ 32 (2004) (quoting Richard Armitage).
53. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 13–16.
54. Yoo, supra note 25, at 735.
55. Id. at 730, 758–62, 787.
56. ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 6 (1974).
57. Id. at 65.
58. Id.
59. Id. (quoting Dean Acheson, Remarks at the Proceedings of the Ameri-
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This imminent attack requirement has prompted the Bush
administration to claim that it has merely “adapt[ed] the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”60 Yoo and other administration officials
have attempted to redefine imminence to shift the inquiry from
timing to probability of harm. Yoo argues that the post-9/11
world “renders the imminence standard virtually meaningless,
because there is no ready means to detect whether a terrorist
attack is about to occur.”61 Therefore, the imminence standard
applied literally to a world of modern weaponry, rogue states,
and terrorists “would be a suicide pact.”62 Instead of defining
imminence as the moment when a blow is just about to land,
Yoo would define imminence in terms of the likelihood of the
attack occurring. Where the magnitude of the harm is great, as
in a potential terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, Yoo
would require a lesser probability.63 In short, the preventive
war doctrine substitutes ad hoc balancing for clear rules.
The problem with substituting “probable” or even “inevitable” for “imminent” is that odds-making is an inherently speculative enterprise. We simply cannot know whether the odds
were five percent, fifty percent, or ninety percent that Saddam
Hussein eventually would have obtained and used weapons of
mass destruction against the United States or given them to
terrorists to use against the United States. As former German
Chancellor Otto van Bismarck once remarked in rejecting similar arguments for preventive war, “‘one can never anticipate
the ways of divine providence securely enough for that.’”64 A
test that requires decision makers to divine the possibility of a
probable attack in the future contains no meaningful standard
at all.

can Society of International Law, 57th Annual Meeting 14 (Apr. 25–27, 1963),
in INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 107, 108 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996)).
60. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 15. “[N]ew technology
requires new thinking about when a threat actually becomes ‘imminent.’”
Condoleezza Rice, Remarks on the President’s National Security Strategy at
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html.
61. Yoo, supra note 25, at 750.
62. Id. at 756.
63. Id. at 753–55.
64. GORDON A. CRAIG, THE POLITICS OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY 1640–1945,
at 255 (1955) (quoting Otto van Bismarck).
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The other coercive preventive tactics employed as part of
this new paradigm also substitute vague balancing tests for
clear rules. Few rules are clearer than domestic and international law’s absolute ban on torture and cruel and inhumane
treatment.65 Yet, driven by the need to obtain information believed essential to preventing future terrorist attacks, the administration effectively abandoned the law’s clear rule and embraced a totality of circumstances, ad hoc balancing test. In the
Office of Legal Counsel’s August 1, 2002 memorandum on torture, Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee not only set forth
an extremely narrow view of what constitutes torture, but also
argued that government employees who engage in torture
would have a defense of necessity, based on a vague balancing
of the likelihood that a suspect had information needed to prevent a future attack and the magnitude of the potential harm.66
The Bybee memo was consistent with the administration’s
amorphous, ill-defined pledge to treat detainees humanely
where “consistent with military necessity.”67 Administration officials provided an ambiguous definition for “inhumane treatment,” claiming that techniques such as waterboarding, mock
executions, physical beatings, and painful stress positions could
be lawful “depend[ing] on the facts and circumstances” of each
particular case.68 That approach led soldiers to complain that
there were no clear rules for interrogations.69
Similarly, when Attorney General Ashcroft oversaw the
round-up of more than one thousand foreign nationals in the
weeks after 9/11, he substituted a vague standard for a clear
rule in order to justify holding them without charges for ex65. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (2000); Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10,
1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 42, art. 4.
66. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, U.S. Assistant Attorney Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, Gen.
Counsel to the Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS
81, 108 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
67. Memorandum from George W. Bush, U.S. President, to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President, et al., on the Humane Treatment of Taliban and al
Qaeda Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note
66, at 134, 135.
68. Editorial, Mr. Flanigan’s Answers, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 2005, at A20
(quoting Timothy Flanigan, Nominee to be Deputy Attorney General, in response to written questions from Senator Richard Durbin).
69. Charles Babington & Shailagh Murray, Senate Supports Interrogation
Limits, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2005, at A1.
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tended periods of time.70 Had those nationals been arrested
under criminal law, prosecutors would have faced a constitutional mandate to charge them immediately and to demonstrate, within forty-eight hours before a federal judge, the existence of probable cause that they had committed a crime.71
Before 9/11, immigration regulations contained a similar
bright-line rule, requiring that charges be filed within twentyfour hours of any arrest.72 Even the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot
Act),73 while significantly expanding executive power to detain
persons without charging them, still maintained a clear rule.
That Act provided the Attorney General with the authority to
detain a non-citizen for as long as seven days without charging
them with a crime, upon certification that the authority has
“reasonable grounds to believe” that the non-citizen is engaged
in terrorist activities or other activities that threaten national
security.74 Yet Ashcroft chose not to rely on the Patriot Act, but
rather on a newly enacted regulation replacing the bright-line
rule with a provision allowing the government in times of
emergency to detain aliens for a “reasonable period of time”
while it investigates the detainee.75 What was “reasonable”
turned out to be measured in weeks and months.
The administration discarded the clear rules relating to the
detention of prisoners of war and instead claimed the authority
to indefinitely detain “unlawful enemy combatants,” a term
which remains ill-defined. Until 2001, this term appeared nowhere in U.S. criminal law, international law, or the law of
war.76 It was appropriated from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opin-

70. See infra text accompanying note 75.
71. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
72. Administrative Comment, Indefinite Detention Without Probable
Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 397, 399 (2001).
73. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
74. Id. § 412, 115 Stat. at 350–52 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226a).
75. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2001).
76. Gary Solis, Even a Bad Man Has Rights, WASH. POST, June 25, 2002,
at A19; see also ABA TASK FORCE ON TREATMENT OF ENEMY COMBATANTS,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (2003) [hereinafter ABA REPORT],
available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/recommendations03/109.pdf
(describing the various forms of the term “combatants” in domestic and international law).
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ion in Ex parte Quirin.77 At first, the government provided virtually no criteria at all for defining enemy combatants. A plurality of the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld upheld the
government’s authority to detain an individual as an enemy
combatant, but for the purpose of that case defined the term
“enemy combatant” narrowly as an individual who was “part of
or supporting forces hostile to the United States or its coalition
partners” in Afghanistan and “who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.”78 After Hamdi, the government did not adopt the Court’s definition, but instead
drafted vague regulations that would include as an enemy
combatant persons who had never committed a belligerent act
and who never directly supported hostilities against the United
States.79 The government conceded that its definition of an enemy combatant would cover a “‘little old lady in Switzerland
who writes checks to what she thinks is a charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance alQaeda activities,’ [or] a person who teaches English to the son
of an al-Qaeda member.”80 Similarly, William Haynes II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, defined the term
enemy combatant in December 2002 as a member, agent, or associate of al Qaeda or the Taliban.81 The use of the term associate harkens back to the McCarthy era’s attacks on those who
associated in any way with the Communist Party.82
The Military Commissions Act of 2006, enacted by Congress in response to the Court’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision,83 also includes a definition with no clear standard as to
who can be indefinitely detained as a preventive matter without charge in the war on terror.84 The Act defines an unlawful
enemy combatant as “a person who has engaged in hostilities
77. 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942); accord ABA REPORT, supra note 76, at 4; Solis,
supra note 76.
78. 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3,
Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696)).
79. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 475 (D.D.C.
2005).
80. Id. (citation omitted).
81. Memorandum from William J. Haynes, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of
Def. to Members of the Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law Council of Foreign Relations
(Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/publications/5312/enemy_
combatants.html.
82. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 129–53 (2003).
83. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
84. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 3, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat.
2600, 2601–02 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a).
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or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a
lawful enemy combatant.”85 The Act, however, leaves unclear
who exactly is covered by the ambiguous phrase “purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States
or its co-belligerents.”86 The government could claim that any
civilian who knowingly teaches English to the son of an al
Qaeda member is covered under the definition, despite the absence of any belligerent act or any direct support of hostilities.
Even more standardless than that definition, the statute also
provides that persons can be considered enemy combatants so
long as they have been so deemed “by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under
the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.”87
This circular reasoning establishing that a person is an enemy
combatant if the government says so provides no standard
whatsoever.
The preventive paradigm’s substitution of amorphous balancing tests for clear rules in all these areas invites abuse. Indeed, the history of governmental use of physical coercion for
pretextual reasons against disfavored minorities, dissenters,
aliens, and weaker nations is one important reason for the
law’s insistence on reasonably clear rules limiting the state’s
coercive power.88 The preventive war doctrine is particularly
susceptible to pretextual justifications. Some suspect, for example, that the administration’s emphasis on illicit weapons
and on the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda were pretexts
to justify a war that the administration actually launched for
other reasons: increasing American influence in the Middle
East, spreading democracy, or simply demonstrating United
States resolve to its enemies.89 That suspicion is furthered by
the fact that for years prior to the September 11 attacks key
administration officials, most notably Paul Wolfowitz, had ad85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Cf. Trinkler v. Alabama, 414 U.S. 955, 957 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”).
89. E.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, A War for Oil?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
5, 2003, § 4, at 11; Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 15, 15–16; James P. Rubin, Stumbling into
War, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2003, at 46, 48.
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vocated war to get rid of Saddam Hussein.90 Indeed, after the
war Wolfowitz admitted that the administration chose the
weapons of mass destruction rationale for “bureaucratic reasons,” as it was “the one reason everyone could agree on.”91
Paul Pillar, the intelligence community’s senior analyst for
the Middle East from 2000 to 2005,92 concluded that the administration’s invasion of Iraq was not based on its concern
about Iraqi weapon programs. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Pillar stated that the administration’s “decision to topple
Saddam was driven by other factors—namely, the desire to
shake up the sclerotic power structures of the Middle East and
hasten the spread of more liberal politics and economics in the
region.”93 For Pillar, what was most remarkable about prewar
U.S. intelligence on Iraq was not how wrong it was, but that it
played so small a role in the decision to go to war.94 Pillar, in
charge of coordinating all of the intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraq, did not receive a single request from
any administration policymaker for any such assessment prior
to the war.95
Even where a government is not acting pretextually, but
honestly believes coercive preventive measures are necessary to
prevent a terrorist attack, the absence of clear rules creates a
strong danger of abuse. For example, the government’s vague
instructions governing interrogations allowed some soldiers to
engage in inhumane tactics not simply for sadistic reasons but
also in the course of honestly attempting to obtain information,
as apparently happened frequently at Guantánamo and in detention centers in Iraq.96 Ad hoc balancing thus provides little
or no restraint on wrongful executive conduct, whether such
conduct is undertaken pretextually or for sincere reasons.

90. United States Policy Toward Iraq: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
National Security, 105th Cong. 74–78 (1998) (statement of Paul Wolfowitz).
91. JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., WMD IN IRAQ: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 13 (2004).
92. Pillar, supra note 89, at 15.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id. at 17–18.
95. Id.
96. E.g., Kevin Bohn et al., FBI Reports Guantanamo “Abuse,” CNN.COM,
Dec. 8, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/12/08/guantanamo.abuse/.
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B. SUBSTITUTING SUSPICION FOR OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE
Closely linked to the law’s requirement that clear rules,
not vague standards, limit a government’s ability to use coercive measures against individuals or other states, is the requirement that such measures be based on objectively determinable proof and not mere suspicion. Yet predicting future
threats inevitably relies on suspicion, inference, probabilities,
circumstantial evidence, and hunches rather than on solid, objective, and visible evidence. Professor George Fletcher at Columbia University aptly articulated the reason that democratic
law generally forbids the preventive use of force against both
other states as well as individuals:
Preemptive strikes are illegal in international law as they are illegal
internally in every legal system of the world. They are illegal because
they are not based on a visible manifestation of aggression; they are
grounded in a prediction of how the feared enemy is likely to behave
in the future.97

There are, of course, occasions when the state can use force
to prevent a wrong that has not yet occurred: to thwart conspiracies or attempted attacks, or to respond to imminent attacks from another nation.98 Conspiracies or attempts, however, generate some objective evidence of an agreement to
commit wrongdoing, and the law requires some overt act in furtherance of the plan or some evidence of a substantial step to
commit wrongdoing.99 In contrast, in times of emergency the
state often claims that its preventive response cannot be limited by a rule requiring objective evidence that a crime is being
planned and that concrete steps have been taken in furtherance of the crime; rather, the government claims that a coercive
response may be based on suspicion.100
The substitution of suspicion for objective evidence can be
seen in the administration’s coercive preventive measures: pre97. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 134 (1998);
see also Jane Campbell Moriarty, “While Dangers Gather”: The Bush Preemption Doctrine, Battered Women, Imminence, and Anticipatory Self-Defense, 30
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 21–22 (2005). While the Model Penal Code
attempted to introduce some flexibility into the concept of imminence, id. at 21
n.112, most states have adhered to the traditional notion of imminence as
temporally imminent, and even the states that have interpreted the language
liberally still require that the defendant have a reasonable “perception of imminent harm,” id. at 21 n.111.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
99. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.03(5) (1985).
100. See RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE 9/11, at 166 (2006).
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ventive war, preventive detention, and extraordinary rendition.
To justify each of these tactics, the administration has presented suspicions and hunches masquerading as objective certainty. As journalist Ron Suskind reported, the war on terror
has been guided by little more than “the principle of actionable
suspicion,” as one former intelligence chief called it.101 “We
were operating, frantically, in a largely evidence-free environment. But the whole concept was that not having hard evidence
shouldn’t hold you back.”102 As Vice President Dick Cheney argued, if there is just a one percent chance of the unimaginable
happening, we have to treat that chance as a certainty.103
The preventive paradigm’s treatment of suspicion as objective fact was most evident in the administration’s headlong
drive toward war against Iraq from 2002 to 2003.104 The administration’s suspicions that Iraq was hiding stocks of chemical and biological weapons were shared by many observers, including Hans Blix, the director of the UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission for Iraq (known as
UNMOVIC), whose task was to determine Iraqi compliance
with the UN’s mandate that it destroy its dangerous weapons
and dismantle its prohibited weapons programs.105 But as a
lawyer and long-time diplomat, Blix viewed his mandate as
most lawyers would: to find solid, reliable evidence to determine whether Iraq still had or was producing weapons of mass
destruction.106 Despite his “gut feeling” that Iraq was hiding
stocks of chemical and biological weapons, Blix had not been
“asked by the Security Council to submit suspicions or simply
to convey testimony from defectors.”107 “Assessments and
judgments in our reports,” Blix felt, “had to be based on evidence that would remain convincing even under critical international examination.”108
Blix’s focus on solid evidence—evidence that would withstand critical international scrutiny—of whether Iraq actually
had outlawed weapons increasingly collided with the preventive paradigm’s inevitable reliance on suspicion, inferences,
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 62.
See id. at 166–68.
HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 3, 264 (2004).
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
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probabilities, circumstantial evidence, and hunches. As National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and President Bush
argued, waiting for conclusive proof of Saddam Hussein’s determination to obtain nuclear weapons was simply too risky,
because “we don’t want the smoking gun to become a mushroom cloud.”109
U.S. officials repeatedly treated suspicions as if they were
fact. Administration officials continuously asserted that they
were not merely suspicious of Iraq, but rather that they
“knew,” were “absolutely certain,” or had “no doubt” that Saddam Hussein had a reconstituted nuclear weapons program,
had hundreds of tons of chemical and biological weapons, and
was producing more of such weapons. On September 8, 2002,
for example, Vice President Cheney stated on Meet the Press
that we “know, with absolute certainty that [Saddam Hussein]
is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he
needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon.”110
On Fox News, Secretary of State Colin Powell claimed that
“[t]here’s no doubt that [Saddam Hussein] has chemical
weapon stocks.”111 A month later, in a speech in Cincinnati,
Ohio, President Bush again exuded certainty: “If we know Saddam Hussein has dangerous weapons today—and we do—does
it make any sense for the world to wait to confront him as he
grows even stronger and develops even more dangerous weapons?”112 In March 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
made the astounding claim that U.S. officials not only knew
that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but knew their location. “We know where they are,” he told ABC News.113
Hans Blix and his inspection team sought to find objective
evidence to verify these claims.114 The inspectors searched al109. RECORD, supra note 52, at 33 (citing Scott Peterson, Can Hussein Be
Deterred?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 10, 2002, at A1). President Bush
also said in an October 7, 2002 speech in Cincinnati, Ohio that “[f ]acing clear
evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun, that
could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.” Address to the Nation on Iraq
from Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 22, at 1754.
110. Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2002) (emphasis
added).
111. Fox News Sunday (Fox News Network television broadcast Sept. 8,
2002) (emphasis added).
112. Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 22, at
1752 (emphasis added).
113. This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast
Mar. 30, 2003).
114. BLIX, supra note 105, at 264.
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most seven hundred sites for potential evidence of prohibited
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, including many sites
identified by U.S. and other nations’ intelligence services.115
Blix reported that “at none of the many sites we actually inspected had we found any prohibited activity.”116
Similarly, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),
after three months of intrusive inspections, including the inspections of all sites identified in overhead satellite imaging as
having suspicious activity, found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq.117
The IAEA concluded after extensive investigation that the
much publicized aluminum tubes that Iraq had attempted to
import were not likely to have been connected to the manufacture of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium.118 And, the
IAEA and outside experts also determined that the reported
uranium contracts between Iraq and Niger, cited by President
Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address, were forgeries.119
Administration officials’ claims that Iraq had a collaborative relationship with al Qaeda were also based on suspicions,
surmise, possibilities, and speculative, secret intelligence masquerading as reliable fact. After the September 11 attacks,
Wolfowitz estimated that there was a ten to fifty percent
chance that Iraq was behind the attacks—a probability analysis based on no reliable intelligence data.120 Immediately after
September 11, Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld urged the President to
confront Iraq.121 President Bush had the same gut feeling, telling his advisors that “I believe Iraq was involved.”122
While the U.S. intelligence community generally correctly
concluded that Iraq and al Qaeda had no collaborative relationship,123 President Bush repeatedly claimed that Saddam Hus115. Id. at 156.
116. Id.
117. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4714th mtg. at 8, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4714 (Mar.
7, 2003).
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id. at 8.
120. DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE
OF THE WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 147 (2005).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Staff Statement No. 15 “Overview of the Enemy,” in 4 THE 9/11 COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS AND ANALYSIS 441, 445 (2005) (concluding that there
was no “collaborative relationship” between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda);
see also S. REP. NO. 108-301, at 346 (2004) (“The Central Intelligence Agency
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sein was “dealing with Al Qa[e]da,”124 had “provided al Qa[e]da
with chemical and biological weapons training,”125 and that
“you can’t distinguish between al Qa[e]da and Saddam when
you talk about the war on terror.”126 In addition, Colin Powell
warned the Security Council of the “sinister nexus between
Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network.”127
Administration officials afterwards admitted that they had
lacked concrete facts, but argued that they needed to act based
on possibilities, not objective evidence. Powell later admitted
that he indeed had no “smoking gun, concrete evidence about
the connection” between Iraq and al Qaeda.128 “But,” he continued, “I think the possibility of such connections did exist.”129
General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, recognized the limitations of intelligence. “Intelligence
doesn’t necessarily mean something is true,” he said at a Pentagon news briefing after major combat ended in Iraq.130 He
further remarked that “You know it’s your best estimate of the
situation. It doesn’t mean it’s a fact. I mean, that’s not what intelligence is.”131 In the absence of hard evidence on Iraqi programs, officials developed a “mosaic,” or a “threat picture,” and
“connected a lot of dots from multiple sources” to form a “judgment.”132 Or as Donald Rumsfeld later conceded, we “did not
reasonably assessed that there were likely several instances of contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida throughout the 1990s, but that these contacts did not
add up to an established formal relationship.”); Douglas Jehl, Questioning
Nearly Every Aspect of the Responses to Sept. 11 and Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2004, at A18.
124. The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2039, 2049 (Nov. 7,
2002).
125. The President’s Weekly Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 140, 140 (Feb.
8, 2003).
126. Remarks Prior to Discussions with President Alvaro Uribe of Columbia and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1656, 1657 (Sept. 25,
2002).
127. Powell’s Address, Presenting ‘Deeply Troubling’ Evidence on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A18 (transcript of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s address to the United Nations Security Council).
128. Christopher Marquis, Powell Admits No Hard Proof in Linking Iraq to
Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A10 (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. James Risen et al., In Sketchy Data, Trying to Gauge Iraq Threat,
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2003, at A1.
131. Id.
132. CIRINCIONE ET AL., supra note 91, at 17 (quoting This Week with
George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast June 8, 2003) (Condoleeza
Rice); Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 8, 2002) (Dick Cheney)).
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act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic new evidence of
Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the
prism of our experience on 9/11.”133
Therefore, even if the administration was not using the
preventive rationale as a pretext to achieve other goals, the
administration’s substitution of suspicion for observable, verifiable evidence allowed real fears to distort, shade, or color the
actual evidence so as to, in Cheney’s words, treat a very small
possibility as if it were a certainty.134 To Blix, the administration in effect adopted a “faith-based” approach to war: the administration “knew,” as if on faith, that Hussein was evil, had
dangerous weapons, and was associated with evildoers like
Osama bin Laden.135 All it needed to do was to find the evidence to confirm that view. Blix analogized the administration’s approach to the Salem Witch Trials: “The witches exist;
you are appointed to deal with these witches; testing whether
there are witches is only a dilution of the witch hunt.”136 As in
the Middle Ages, because people were convinced there were
witches, “‘they certainly found them.’”137
The substitution of suspicion for objective evidence is endemic to the preventive paradigm, for predictions about the future are inherently speculative. This same substitution characterizes the administration’s coercive prevention programs that
it has used to fight the war on terror since September 11. As
with Iraq, suspicion often masquerades as certainty.
The extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar to Syria illustrates the preventive paradigm’s reliance on suspicion, often
with draconian results. Arar, a Canadian citizen born in Syria,
was on his way home to Canada from a family vacation in Tunisia in September 2002 when he stopped to change planes at
Kennedy Airport in New York.138 He was detained by the U.S.
government at the airport based on information supplied by the

133. RECORD, supra note 52, at 112.
134. SUSKIND, supra note 100, at 62.
135. BLIX, supra note 105, at 263.
136. Id. at 202.
137. Blix Attacks Iraq Weapons ‘Spin,’ CNN.COM, Sept. 18, 2003, http://
www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/09/18sprj.irq.blix.bush/index.html (quoting
Hans Blix).
138. 60 Minutes II: His Year in Hell (CBS television broadcast July 15,
2005).

LOBEL_4FMT

1430

6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1407

Canadian Royal Mounted Police.139 The Canadian Police had
sent a report to the United States which, based on Arar’s mere
acquaintances with other men under suspicion of being terrorists, listed Arar and his wife as “Islamic Extremist individuals
suspected of being linked to the al Qaeda terrorist movement.”140 The Canadian suspicions turned out to be completely
false. After an exhaustive two-year investigation, in September
2006, a Canadian Commission chaired by appellate judge Dennis R. O’Connor concluded that Arar was never a member of al
Qaeda or associated with any terrorist group.141 Judge
O’Connor stated “categorically that there is no evidence to indicate that Mr. Arar has committed any offense or that his activities constitute a threat to the security of Canada.”142
Nonetheless, the U.S. Justice Department detained Arar in
New York for two weeks, harshly interrogated him, and then
secretly flew him to Jordan, where he was then taken to
Syria.143 The Syrians held him in a tiny cell termed the grave
cell, and in the initial weeks of detention tortured him.144 Over
a year later, after concluding that Arar had no connection to
terrorism, the Syrian government released him.145
At the time the U.S. government rendered Arar to Syria it
knew that it had no objective evidence that Arar was a terrorist
or al Qaeda member.146 Nonetheless, INS officials operated as if
they were certain that Arar was a terrorist. In deciding to deport Arar, the INS Regional Director determined that the evidence “clearly and unequivocally reflects that Mr. Arar is a
member of a foreign terrorist organization, to wit, Al Qaeda.”147
Yet, according to the Canadian Commission’s Report, only
three days earlier, Canadian counter-terrorism officials sent a
fax to the FBI which stated that while Arar “had contact with”
139. Ottawa Must Act Now on RCMP Watchdog: Arar, CBC NEWS, Dec. 12,
2006, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/12/12/oconnor-report.html?ref=rss.
140. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CAN. OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 20–21 (2006) [hereinafter CAN. COMM’N
REPORT].
141. See id.
142. Id. at 59.
143. 60 Minutes II, supra note 138.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. CAN. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 140, at 154.
147. Scott Shane, Torture Victim Had No Terror Link, Canada Told U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2006, at A10.
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suspicious individuals, the officials were “unable to indicate
links to al-Qaeda,” and had “yet to complete . . . a detailed investigation of Mr. Arar.”148 The Commission also reported that
the next day a Canadian official and an FBI officer spoke by
phone and both concluded that there was insufficient evidence
to charge Arar with a crime either in Canada or in the United
States—a conclusion that would not have been true if they had
clear and unequivocal information that Arar was an al Qaeda
member.149
Not only did U.S. officials inflate the information they received from Canada, treating suspicion as if it were clear and
unequivocal evidence, but they also kept Canadian officials in
the dark about their plans for Arar. The Canadian foreign ministry was not initially informed of Arar’s detention, and American officials denied Mr. Arar’s requests to talk to the Canadian
Consulate in New York, a violation of U.S. treaty obligations
with Canada.150 The Canadian Commission concluded that the
American officials kept Canadian officials in the dark about the
plans with respect to Arar because they “believed—quite correctly—that, if informed, the Canadians would have serious
concerns about the plan to remove Mr. Arar to Syria.”151 Even
after Arar’s deportation to Syria, the U.S. government did not
inform Canada of Arar’s whereabouts, and the Canadians only
learned two weeks later from the Syrians that he was there.152
Once the Canadians learned that Arar was in Syria, his torture
and interrogations stopped.153
The Arar case raises the question of why the U.S. government would send a detained Canadian citizen whom it suspects
may be a terrorist to Syria, a country which the State Department accuses of practicing torture and being a state sponsor of
terrorism, and not to Canada, the United States’ friend and
ally. The answer lies in the preventive paradigm: U.S. government officials must have believed that Syria would detain and
use coercive interrogation methods on Arar to obtain information needed to prevent future terrorist acts—information that
could not be obtained by normal police methods used by Canada or the United States. The Canadian Commission Report
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

CAN. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 140, at 148.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 154, 184.
Id. at 188–89.
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found that, unlike Syria, Canada would not have detained
Arar.154 Canadian officials told their American counterparts
that they would place Arar under surveillance.155 But that
measure obviously did not suffice for the United States; relying
on suspicions, the U.S. government wanted to detain Arar and
coerce him into disclosing what U.S. officials believed he knew.
Similarly, the more than one thousand mainly Muslim
immigrants rounded up after September 11 were detained
based on mere suspicions, often with no objective evidence, and
sometimes held for months before the government released
them or deported them for immigration violations unrelated to
terrorism.156 As one example, a Yemeni man was arrested after
accompanying his American wife to her military base in Kentucky because his wife was wearing a hijab (the head scarf that
many Muslim women wear).157 The FBI investigators noticed
the couple speaking a foreign language—French—and in their
suitcase they carried box cutters which they had both used in
their work.158 He was held for almost two months without any
evidence ever being presented against him.159 His wife, who
had also been detained, accepted an honorable discharge from
the Army.160 Indeed, of the more than five thousand aliens who
have been preventively detained in the United States since
September 11, not one has been convicted of any terrorist
crime.161
An inherent problem with the preventive paradigm’s reliance on suspicions and hunches about future conduct is what
psychologists and scientists have long recognized to be a deeply
rooted human tendency to interpret evidence in a manner that
confirms one’s preexisting theories or beliefs.162 As early as

154. Id. at 154.
155. Id.
156. COLE, supra note 82, at 25–26.
157. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedom While Defending Against Terrorism Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 215–17 (2001) (statement of Ali Al-Maqtari).
158. Id. at 216.
159. Id. at 217.
160. Id.
161. See COLE, supra note 82, at 26; Alex Gourevitch, Detention Disorder:
Ashcroft’s Clumsy Round-up of Foreigners Lurches Forward, AM. PROSPECT
ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2003, http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2003/01/gourevitch
-a-01-31.html.
162. See, e.g., Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous
Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175–77 (1998).
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1620, Sir Francis Bacon explained this phenomenon:
The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion
draws all things else to support and agree with it. And though there
be a greater number and weight of instances to be found on the other
side, yet these it either neglects and despises, or else by some distinction sets aside and rejects, in order that by this great and pernicious
predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may remain
inviolate.163

Such “confirmation bias” was certainly operative in the run
up to the Iraq war, as U.S. officials cherry-picked and manipulated the facts, exaggerating evidence supporting their position
and disregarding contrary indications.164 As the Senate Commission investigating the intelligence failure leading to the
Iraq war observed, there was “a tendency of analysts to believe
that which fits their theories,” and that analysts had “tunnel
vision,” meaning that they “simply disregarded evidence that
did not support their hypotheses.”165
Senior intelligence official Paul Pillar suggests that intelligence analysts and policymakers seeking to tie an individual or
government to terrorism face other common biases and difficulties.166 Finding a tie between a particular government or individual and a terrorist organization is particularly subject to
bias because
[i]n the shadowy world of international terrorism, almost anyone can
be “linked” to almost anyone else if enough effort is made to find evidence of casual contacts, the mentioning of names in the same breath,
or indications of common travels or experiences. Even the most minimal and circumstantial data can be adduced as evidence of a “relationship” . . . .167

Law cannot rid us of the predisposition to perceive evidence through the lens of our preconceptions, nor can it eliminate the other biases that affect policymakers and intelligence
analysts. But one function of law is to create institutional and
normative safeguards to counteract these biases. One means of
offsetting bias is to require objectively verifiable evidence of
wrongdoing, rather than relying on suspicions or hunches mas163. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979) (quoting Sir Francis Bacon).
164. See Pillar, supra note 89, at 19.
165. THE COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 87, 162, 169 (2005).
166. Pillar, supra note 89, at 20–21.
167. Id.
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querading as fact. Because it substitutes open-ended prediction
for hard evidence, the preventive paradigm opens the door to
biases, preconceptions, and conscious or unconscious manipulation of the evidence.
C. THE ABSENCE OF INSTITUTIONAL CHECKS
The inherent tension between the rule of law and the preventive paradigm is heightened by the government’s insistence
that executive discretion requires discarding institutional
checks on its power—checks that are ordinarily provided by independent review. The government thus claims that its authority to launch a preventive war is not subject to the UN Charter’s requirement that the Security Council approve of such
wars.168 The government has engaged in extraordinary renditions of over one hundred individuals, yet when it is challenged
in court by Arar, or by the German citizen El-Masri, who was
kidnapped by mistake, the administration has argued, thus far
successfully, that its actions are shielded from judicial review
by the state secrets doctrine, the political question doctrine,
and other principles which counsel against judicial scrutiny.169
In order to prevent judicial scrutiny of the detention of aliens
after September 11, the administration promulgated another
emergency regulation that provided for an automatic stay of
bond pending appeal, de facto allowing the government to detain aliens for more than a year before courts could order their
release.170 And, the administration argued that any alien detained abroad as an enemy combatant was not entitled to a
hearing to determine if he was in fact a combatant, and the judiciary could not scrutinize any such detention.171 According to
the government, even U.S. citizens detained as enemy combatants were entitled to only limited judicial review to determine
whether the government facially set forth some evidentiary ba168. See The President’s News Conference, 1 PUB. PAPERS 255, 251 (Mar. 6,
2003) (“I’m confident the American people understand that when it comes to
our security, if we need to act, we will act, and we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so.”).
169. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), appeal
docketed, No. 1:04CV00249 (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2006); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 539 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, No. 06-1667, 2007 WL 625130 (4th
Cir. Nov. 28, 2006).
170. Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 767, 780 (2002).
171. Brief of Respondents at 21, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos.
03-334, 03-345).
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sis for the detention.172 After the Supreme Court rejected both
of these propositions, the administration nonetheless succeeded
in pressing Congress to remove the judiciary’s habeas jurisdiction over aliens detained as enemy combatants.173
The administration’s short-circuiting of independent
checks on executive power is related to the administration’s acceptance of vague standards and suspicions in place of objective
evidence of clearly defined wrongdoing. For an independent entity to allow the United States to take preventive coercive action, the entity would require the government to proffer some
objective evidence. For example, a majority of nations on the
Security Council refused to authorize the United States-led
preventive war against Iraq, in part because inspectors had not
uncovered any objective evidence that Iraq was hiding prohibited weapons.174 Hence, the United States had to circumvent
the Security Council.175 In addition, it is hard to believe that
any U.S. court would have authorized Arar’s deportation to
Syria; therefore, the administration misled Arar’s lawyer and
the Canadians, thereby denying Arar the opportunity to challenge his pending deportation in court.176 And when the government was forced by the Supreme Court to provide alleged
enemy combatant Hamdi a due process hearing, the government released him to Saudi Arabia rather than conduct such a
hearing.177
II. BALANCING LIBERTY, PEACE AND SECURITY
The argument for coercive preventive measures is based on
a purported trade-off between liberty and security. Proponents
of the preventive paradigm contend that the normal rules of
law are too heavily weighted in favor of liberty to be useful in a
national emergency or crisis. Supporters of supplanting those
rules, such as Richard Posner, argue that when an emergency
172. Brief of Respondents at 19–21, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (No. 03-6696).
173. Military Commissions Act of 2006 Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat.
2600, 2635–36 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)).
174. Nations Take Sides After Powell’s Speech, CNN.COM, Feb. 6, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/02/06/sprj.irq.powell.world.reax/index
.html.
175. See Bush Sends Iraq War Letter to Congress, CNN.COM, Mar. 19,
2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/03/19/sprj.irq.bush/index.html.
176. CAN. COMM’N REPORT, supra note 140, at 154, 184.
177. Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia, WASH. POST, Oct.
12, 2004, at A2.

LOBEL_4FMT

1436

6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1407

arises, “cases involving a clash between liberty and safety cannot yet be governed by rules.”178 The new terrain created by the
September 11 attacks, they argue, makes it more sensible for
both the executive and the courts “to govern by standard,” allowing decision makers to employ ad hoc balancing to reach a
more optimal, flexible balance between the protection of liberty
and the requirements of security—at least until they gain more
experience dealing with the new terrorist threat.179 Accurate
balancing requires decision makers to accept less certainty in
this new situation than the legal rules require and to pay more
attention to an evaluation of the competing risks involved.180
The argument that the post-9/11 threat requires us to jettison the legal principles that have hitherto been deemed essential to constitutional and international law inevitably starts
with the claim that we now face a novel situation which represents a dramatic departure from the context of past emergencies or crisis. President Bush has argued that we have entered
a “new world,”181 that “we face a threat with no precedent,”182
and that the war against terrorism has ushered in a new paradigm which requires “new thinking.”183 In the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, government officials, judges, the media,
and academics emphasized this “new paradigm” confronting
the United States.184
The mentality that we have entered a “new era,” and must
adopt a “new paradigm,” because “everything has changed”
may hinder reasonable balancing of liberty and security. First,
the perception of a new, unprecedented situation leads to the
belief that historical experience and lessons—often encapsulated in legal rules—now can be safely ignored. Posner argues
that the civil libertarians are fundamentally misguided “in
their assumption that the past is a good guide to the fu178. POSNER, supra note 25, at 34.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 7, at 4.
182. West Point, New York, 1 PUB. PAPERS 917, 919 (June 1, 2002).
183. Memorandum from George W. Bush, supra note 67, at 134.
184. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2830 n.6 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzalez to the President (Jan. 25,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 66, at 118, 119 (“In my
judgment, this new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners . . . .”); see also Memorandum from George W.
Bush, supra note 67, at 134 (“[The] new paradigm . . . requires new thinking in
the law of war . . . .”).
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ture . . . . The past does not include attacks on the United
States by terrorists wielding nuclear bombs [or] dirty bombs . . .
[T]he future may well include such attacks.”185 Posner also
surmises that civil libertarians “are looking backward rather
than forward.”186 History, according to Posner, is irrelevant.187
Likewise, the administration’s argument for preventive
war asserts that past experience, as encapsulated in the norms
of international law, is not a relevant guide for balancing the
interests of world peace and national security in the post-9/11
world.188 The administration believes that this new threat
“without precedent” makes our historical rejection of preventive
war doctrine irrelevant to the present situation.189
The legal rules that preclude preventive war, “preventive”
torture, and indefinite and prolonged preventive detention all
encapsulate the bitter lessons of historical experience. The sordid American experience with preventive detention in the
twentieth century suggests that generally such detentions neither safeguard security nor ensure our liberty.190 It is obvious
in hindsight that these disastrous experiences with preventive
detention were unnecessary to protect security; and even at the
time, some informed observers argued that the policies were
flawed and unnecessary. None other than FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, a man not generally known as a civil libertarian,191
argued against the Japanese internment camps, claiming that
the FBI had sufficient capacity using traditional law enforcement surveillance to ferret out and charge any potential Japanese American saboteurs and spies.192
Just as the domestic use of preventive detention to preempt perceived threats has a troubled history, the use of preventive war to preempt new dangers before they occur has often had calamitous consequences. The history of western
185. POSNER, supra note 25, at 47.
186. Id.
187. Cf. id. at 51 (rejecting the tendency of civil libertarians to “narrate a
history of civil liberties violations”).
188. See Yoo, supra note 25, at 734–36 (describing how the administration’s preemptive actions violate international law).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 181–84.
190. See Cole, supra note 27, at 990–97.
191. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 274
(1973).
192. See 117 CONG. REC. H31551–52 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971) (statement
of Rep. Railsback), quoted in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 719–20 (2d
Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
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civilization is filled with major wars commenced for preventive
reasons: Sparta’s declaration of war against Athens commencing the Peloponnesian War,193 Carthage’s preemptive attack on
Rome,194 the preventive war Germany declared against Russia
that initiated World War I,195 and Japan’s surprise attack on
the American fleet at Pearl Harbor,196 to name just a few of the
more notable examples. As political scientist David Hendrickson observes, “Repugnance for preventive war became deeply
embedded in the world community because the use of that doctrine in the twentieth century led to results nearly fatal to civilization.”197
The generally disastrous history of preventive war is not
confined to the twentieth century. According to one study, virtually all of the major wars in Europe between the sixteenth
and twentieth centuries were motivated by prevention; typically a powerful but declining state “engaged in a desperate
race against time”198 to defeat a growing new danger which, it
perceived, would inevitably overwhelm it.199 Another study concludes that between 1848 and 1918, “[e]very war between Great
Powers . . . started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest.”200 All but one “brought disaster on their originators.”201
Yet another analysis of centuries of European warfare finds
that “[p]reventive logic . . . is a ubiquitous motive for war.”202 In
1760, Edmund Burke concluded that the military policy of preventing emerging new threats to the balance of power had been
the source “of innumerable and fruitless wars” in Europe.203
One prominent scholar of the history of warfare concluded after
193. DALE C. COPELAND, THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR 210–11 (2000).
194. See id. at 211–13.
195. See id. at 82–85.
196. See Nobutaka Ike, Introduction to JAPAN’S DECISION FOR WAR, at xiii,
xxiv (Nobutaka Ike ed., 1967) (“By the fall of 1941, the Japanese leaders . . .
had come to believe that they were being pushed into a corner by the United
States and her allies. . . . [N]o course but war seemed possible to the Japanese.”).
197. David C. Hendrickson, Imperialism Versus Internationalism: The
United States and World Order, GAIKO FORUM, Fall 2002, at 35, 36.
198. COPELAND, supra note 193, at 220.
199. See id. at 214–34.
200. A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY OF EUROPE 1848–1918,
at 166 (1954).
201. Id.
202. STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: POWER AND THE ROOTS OF
CONFLICT 76 (1999).
203. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 76 (1977).
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an exhaustive study that the “chief source of insecurity in
Europe since medieval times . . . lies in [nations’] own tendency
to exaggerate the dangers they face, and to respond with counterproductive belligerence.”204 Another scholar of warfare, Columbia Professor Robert Jervis, surveyed the historical record
and concluded that, “[o]n balance, it seems that states are more
likely to overestimate the hostility of others than to underestimate it.”205
The argument that we should abandon the rules restricting
the use of coercive preventive measures because we are now
facing a new world with terrorists capable of possessing and using weapons of mass destruction ignores the fact that these
rules emerged, at least in part, from our experience addressing
perceived new and dangerous threats. States have often argued
that the threat they faced was new or unprecedented to justify
uses of coercive preventive measures.206 These arguments date
back to ancient times, when Spartans debated whether to
launch the disastrous Peloponnesian War because of the “completely different” threat from Athens.207
Similarly, the development of atomic weapons created a
new, unprecedented threat after World War II that led many
Americans to advocate preventive war, arguing that the Soviet
nuclear threat created a fundamentally new international environment in which the normal rules could no longer apply.208
Fortunately, American leaders from Truman to Kennedy rejected these arguments.209 So too the experience with the World
War II roundup of Japanese Americans was justified as a response to a very real, brand new, and qualitatively different
threat: the first significant attack by a foreign power on U.S.
soil in over a century, and the first to use the new technology of
air power capable of striking the United States in a fraction of
the time foreseen by the framers.210 Congress enacted the NonDetention Act of 1971 to ensure that such preventive deten204. VAN EVERA, supra note 202, at 192.
205. Robert Jervis, War & Misperception, 18 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 675, 688
(1988).
206. See, e.g., COPELAND, supra note 193, at 71; JAMES JOLL, THE ORIGINS
OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 87 (1984).
207. THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 75 (1972).
208. See COPELAND, supra note 193, at 171; Marc Trachtenberg, A “Wasting Asset”: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1988–99, at 5, 8–11.
209. See COPELAND, supra note 193, at 173–74.
210. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 5, at 111–14.
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tions of U.S. citizens would not occur in response to any future
real or imagined new threat.211 In short, new threats, a
changed world, and new paradigms are nothing new, and the
rules of law reflect the lessons of our experience in responding
to such new threats.
While this history cannot definitively prove that preventive
war and preventive detention are always counterproductive, it
certainly suggests that we ought to be cautious about replacing
the relatively clear rules of law with the ad hoc balancing test
of the coercive preventive paradigm. Modern social science research also demonstrates the need for skepticism about assertions that the threat of a catastrophic attack requires that we
abandon rules limiting government discretion and adopt a pure
cost-benefit balancing test.212 If as a rule, people rationally calculate the risk of catastrophic harm and counterbalance the
risk of using coercive preventive measures mistakenly, we
might be able to discard the bright-line rules that guard
against emotional and irrational decision making.213 But it
makes little sense to do so if emotion typically prompts people
to exaggerate the risk of catastrophic harm, and therefore to
tolerate many more false positives than any rational calculation would permit.214 In addition, engaging in ad hoc balancing
in emotionally laden crisis situations is likely to undervalue the
potential costs of coercive preventive action, because people
tend to consider only the short term, highly vivid and accessible
costs, while ignoring the dangers that are more abstract.215
211. Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) (2000)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 2 (1971).
212. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 105 (2005) (“[W]orst-case scenarios have a distorting effect on human judgment, often producing excessive
fear about unlikely events. . . . The result is a situation in which people often
show baseless fear . . . .”).
213. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 139–40
(2004) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis is an important step in assessing
catastrophic risk).
214. Cf. Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1045, 1082 (2005) (“[C]ontrary to the intuitive perspective
reached by many academics and policymakers, careful deliberative process is
most important in deciding to go to war or responding to international threats
precisely at those times when it is most likely to be discarded.”).
215. See id. at 1073 (“[E]mote control typically produces an overreaction to
. . . problems . . . that are vividly described and easy to visualize.”); cf. JEFFREY
ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 74 (2004) (“People believe that they are most likely to be victimized
by the threats of which they are most afraid.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism
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Widespread preventive detention without adequate safeguards,
for example, creates numerous risks generally: some detainees
will be radicalized by their treatment and will become terrorist
sympathizers, the Arab and Muslim communities in the United
States will grow distrustful and be less likely to cooperate in
tracking down terrorists, and al Qaeda will use our actions to
recruit more terrorists.216 If one could rationally calculate the
total costs, one might find out that such preventive detention
may very well increase the risk of a terrorist attack instead of
reducing it.
Psychological studies highlight the difficulties in rationally
balancing these costs and benefits. Decision making is often
based on emotive, affect-based mental processes, which tend to
diverge from rational cognitive assessments of risk.217 When
faced with a potential catastrophe that has a small chance of
eventuating, people tend either to ignore the risk or to exaggerate it.218 At times, to be sure, we may discount risks that would
warrant more forceful action.219 Particularly where worst case
scenarios evoke vivid, emotion-laden images of recent events,
however, people are much more likely to overreact.220 As University of Chicago Professor Cass Sunstein has noted, “worstcase scenarios have a distorting effect on human judgment, often producing excessive fear about unlikely events.”221
Three phenomena particularly distort the rational costbalancing equation proposed by the preventive paradigm. The
first is that humans react more emotionally to perceived new
situations than to things they have already experienced.222 Our
affective systems are much more sensitive to situations that
appear to be new, but they adapt readily to ongoing or repeated

and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121, 127–28 (2003) (“[T]he
word ‘terrorism’ evokes vivid images of a disaster . . . .”).
216. COLE, supra note 82, at 183–87.
217. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 267, 269 (2001) (describing the “divergence of emotional responses from
cognitive evaluation of risks”).
218. POSNER, supra note 213, at 248.
219. See, e.g., id. at 249 (“There is no historical memory of asteroids colliding with the earth and so we find it hard to take the threat of such collisions
seriously even if we accept that it exists.”).
220. See Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 214, at 1070 (“The problem of
vivid, emotional miscalculation of risk is particularly acute in the antiterrorism context, since fear is a particularly strong emotion . . . .”).
221. SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 105.
222. See Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 214, at 1056–57.
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stimuli.223 In contrast, the deliberative system is much more
aligned to “ongoing, stable situations.”224 As a result, when we
face what is widely perceived to be a new, qualitatively different terrorist threat—as occurred after September 11—we are
much more likely to emotionally overreact rather than rationally balance costs and benefits.
Second, emotions are highly attuned to visual imagery;
such images skew cost-benefit balancing.225 Terrorist incidents
are likely to prompt what Sunstein terms “probability neglect,”
the tendency to overreact to small risks of catastrophic
harms.226 The aftermath of the September 11 attacks demonstrated the propensity of emotions that are activated by an
immediate, vivid, and potentially catastrophic situation to exaggerate risks. A study conducted a few weeks after 9/11 found
that the average person believed that he or she faced a twenty
percent chance of being personally hurt in a terrorist attack
within the next year.227 This risk perception was seriously exaggerated. Indeed, individuals would not have faced that high a
risk even if a terrorist attack of the same magnitude as the 9/11
attacks took place every day for an entire year.228
Similarly, when people were asked how much they would
pay for flight insurance to cover losses resulting from terrorism, they agreed to pay more than when asked what they
would pay for flight insurance to cover losses from all causes.229
This patently irrational result can be explained by the fact that
asking about terrorism evokes vivid images of disaster, leading
people to overestimate the risk.230 Canadians, cognizant of recent vivid examples of persons afflicted with the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome virus in their country, evaluated their
risk of contracting the disease as much higher than did Americans, despite the fact that citizens of both nations faced statistically similar risks.231 In short, when vivid visual images trig223. See id.
224. Id.
225. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 81 (“[V]isualization or imagery matters a great deal to people’s reactions to risks.”).
226. See id. at 64–65.
227. ROSEN, supra note 215, at 73.
228. Id. at 74.
229. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions and Insurance
Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39–42 (1993).
230. SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 40.
231. See Neal Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks:
A Cross-National Comparison, 69 MO. L. REV. 991, 995, 999 (2004).
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ger strong emotions, people tend to overestimate the danger of
small, disastrous risks.232 As Sunstein argues,
In the context of terrorism, the implication is clear. The risks associated with terrorist attacks are highly likely to trigger strong emotions, in part because of the sheer vividness of the bad outcome and
the associated levels of outrage and fear. It follows that even if the
likelihood of an attack is extremely low, people will be willing to pay a
great deal to avoid it.233

Studies confirm that people will overestimate the risk of
danger when their emotions are triggered. In one study, people
were informed that radon and nuclear waste in the foundation
of their homes presented similar risks of cancer, but they reported an exaggerated risk with respect to the nuclear waste
because they were angry about the source of the threat.234 In
another study, people repeatedly judged the risks of an activity
based on whether they had positive or negative feelings about
it, irrespective of its actual risk.235 When they felt positive
about an activity, they interpreted its risks as low and its benefits as high.236 If they felt negative about the activity, they
judged its risks as high and its benefits as low.237 In fact, risk
and benefit are often positively correlated.238 Many risky activities have substantial benefits and many activities that are not
risky at all have virtually no benefit, but people routinely substitute their feelings about an activity for a rational calculation
of its risks and benefits.239
These studies suggest that emotional issues such as terrorism will inevitably skew policymakers’ application of ad hoc
analysis based on worst-case scenarios. Individuals and political leaders will be unable to rationally assess the dangers and
benefits of coercive preventive policies. Moreover, to the extent
that the costs of these policies tend to be borne in the future,
232. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 81; Loewenstein et al., supra note
217, at 275–76.
233. Sunstein, supra note 215, at 124.
234. Peter M. Sandman et al., Communications to Reduce Risk Underestimation and Overestimation, 3 RISK DECISION & POL’Y 93, 106–07 (1998).
235. Paul Slovic, What’s Fear Got to Do with It? It’s Affect We Need to Worry
About, 69 MO. L. REV. 971, 977 (2004).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 976–77.
239. See id. See generally Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS & BIASES 397, 400–01 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing
studies that demonstrated the impact of affect over costs and benefits in behavior).
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and are intangible and abstract—such as the costs associated
with undermining the rule of law—those costs will be undervalued.240 The resulting cost-benefit analysis will inevitably be
distorted in favor of taking coercive preventive action, even
when rational consideration demonstrates that the costs outweigh the benefits.
Of course, government officials do not always overestimate
threats and risks in times of crisis. Indeed, social science posits
that where a threat has no new vivid, visual example, people
tend to ignore it.241 Global warming and the rise of fascism in
Germany are historical examples of that tendency.242 However,
where there is a visually vivid, outrageous, and immediate
threat, decision makers generally overreact to the detriment of
both liberty and security.243
Third, and potentially even more problematic, the risks
posed by terrorist threats are often not quantifiable at all. Insurance experts and psychologists distinguish between “risk,” a
probability that is capable of being estimated, and “uncertainty,” a probability that is unquantifiable.244 Terrorist threats
generally fall in the latter category.245 Because of the difficulty
of estimating risk of catastrophic harm, the private insurance
market would not provide insurance against terrorism at reasonable rates.246 Consequently, Congress enacted the Terrorism
Risk Insurance Act of 2002, which in effect requires the public
to insure the insurers against calamitous losses from a terrorist
attack.247
Cost-benefit advocates such as Posner and Yoo recognize
that cost-benefit analysis in this context is purely subjective.
Posner admits that in the present setting “risks and harms

240. See Lobel & Loewenstein, supra note 214, at 1082.
241. See POSNER, supra note 213, at 247–49 (describing how familiar
threats like nuclear weapons are feared, while risks of unknown calamities
like asteroid collisions are ignored).
242. See id.; RECORD, supra note 52, at 80.
243. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 81.
244. Michelle E. Boardman, Knowing Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism
Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784 (2005).
245. Id. (describing the risk of terrorism as “fundamentally incalculable,”
and discouraging insurers from issuing terrorism insurance).
246. See A Safety Solution: Terrorism Insurance Program Spreads Risk
Around, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 13, 2005, at E8.
247. Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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cannot be measured,”248 and that assessing the relevant needs
and dangers of preventive detention is a subjective process that
“requires a weighing of imponderables.”249 Ironically, Yoo admits the difficulties of balancing costs and benefits in his critique of the Hamdi plurality’s reliance on the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test250 to weigh the citizen’s interest to be free
from involuntary confinement against the government’s national security interest.251 Yoo argues that “[i]t is difficult to
understand how the Mathews test can be applied with any serious coherence.”252
Should a court gauge the government’s interest in protecting the national security by multiplying the number of lives potentially saved by
the reduction in the probability of an attack—factoring in the uniform
value of a life as measured by the Environmental Protection Agency?
And how should the government measure the individual liberty interest in not being detained—as the average price that an average citizen would pay per hour to avoid detention? If these efforts to
monetize the prongs of the Mathews test seem silly, it may be because
there is no systematic, rational way to quantify these competing values.253

But if judges cannot rationally weigh these competing interests, why should executive officials be able to do so? Yoo’s
argument proves too much: it suggests that the elaborate balancing facade of the preventive paradigm really masks emotional decision making based on fears, hunches, and intuitions,
rather than costs and benefits.
This critique of the use of ad hoc balancing to decide
whether coercive preventive measures are warranted prompts
several objections. First, virtually all legal rules involve some
sort of balancing, and therefore one cannot escape the problem
of attempting to balance competing values and costs simply by
relying on purportedly clear rules. There are almost always exceptions to the supposed clear rules, and whether the exceptions should apply in any particular case requires the decision
maker to balance competing interests and costs.
While it is true that legal decision making generally involves some sort of balancing, the existence of fairly clear rules
and the need to present objective evidence provide checks, re248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

POSNER, supra note 25, at 41.
Id. at 66.
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 587–89 (2006).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 588–89.
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straints, and presumptions to guide our decisions. Law cannot
rid us of our predispositions, emotional biases, or our exaggerated fears, but adopting and attempting to follow clear rules
can provide a counterbalance to these emotional reactions. In
that sense, legal rules help us balance correctly, by imposing a
test which reflects a balance articulated by our deliberative
processes before a crisis hits for one more likely to be influenced by emotional reactions in the immediate aftermath of a
crisis.254 Ironically, the need for clear legal rules is greatest precisely when the crisis seems to demand discarding them.255
For example, the rule that only the Security Council, and
not individual or ad hoc groups of nations, can launch or authorize preventive wars does not absolutely remove the need for
balancing a particular threat against the dangers of warfare.
The rule does, however, reflect a strong substantive presumption that such wars are undesirable, and it imposes the procedural check that the decision be made by an international body
composed of countries which may have a less emotional stake
in going to war.256 Similarly, the absolute prohibition against
torture may not prevent a military officer from disobeying the
law and torturing a prisoner if he strongly believes that thousands of lives are imminently threatened by a ticking bomb and
can be saved by coercive interrogation. This type of balancing,
however, must be informed by the fact that the officer is acting
unlawfully and is subject to criminal prosecution for his actions. That the criminal law imposes a serious penalty for
faulty balancing will presumably act as a substantial restraint
on the officer. In contrast, ad hoc balancing under vague standards imposes virtually no legal restraints on decision makers.
Another objection to maintaining clear rules during crisis
concedes that exaggerated fears during a crisis may skew decision making, but argues that nonetheless the elevated risk of
harm warrants a modification of the legal rules that apply in
non-emergency periods. That people may have an exaggerated,
emotional response to a new threat does not necessarily mean

254. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 212, at 105–106.
255. See id.
256. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (permitting individual nations to act in selfdefense in response to an armed attack); Mark A. Drumbl, Victimhood in Our
Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002) (describing the UN prohibition on the use of force).
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that the new threat does not create new risks which justify
changing the status quo.
I do not argue that emergencies never require reevaluating
or modifying legal rules to meet new situations; I merely contend that we should not abandon legal rules for ad hoc decision
making whenever a new crisis hits. Of course we should always
evaluate the legal rules in the context of a complex and changing environment. For example, prior to September 11, international law did not clearly define non-state terrorist attacks as
armed attacks that would accord the victim state a right of selfdefense.257 After September 11, NATO unequivocally, and the
UN Security Council more ambiguously recognized such a right
of self-defense.258 A new threat may require some modification
of the legal rules, but policymakers should avoid discarding the
relevant legal rules in favor of ambiguous standards and ad hoc
balancing tests simply because we face a new crisis.
Second, despite the increased risk of harm in times of
emergency, we should be skeptical about proposals made in the
heat of crisis to significantly modify the rules developed prior to
the crisis. Many of the existing rules were not developed simply
for “normal” times but were explicitly based on experience with
past crises and with prior arguments that new conditions required coercive measures. For example, Congress enacted the
Non-Detention Act of 1971 prohibiting preventive detention of
U.S. citizens unless explicitly authorized by congressional statute because it wanted to ensure that what happened to Japanese American citizens during World War II would not occur in
any future war.259 Congress enacted the law to deal with wartime and other national emergency conditions because it concluded—based on historical experience—that despite the increased dangers of wartime, executive preventive detention was
not warranted unless explicitly authorized by Congress.260 We
should not discard that calculation simply because we are now
experiencing dangers that differ from those we have faced in
the past. Shouldn’t we trust the balance that Congress thought
should apply in wartime when it studied the problem in a non257. See Drumbl, supra note 256, at 26–33.
258. See S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); Press
Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01
-124e.htm.
259. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 2 (1971).
260. Id. at 3–5.
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crisis situation, rather than the balance which seems to make
sense in the immediate and emotional aftermath of the crisis?
At a minimum, we should be skeptical of claims to modify protections intended to apply in wartime, simply because there is a
new wartime crisis. So too, the international community and
U.S. Senate concluded that torture and cruel and inhumane
treatment could never be justified—even during wartime and
emergencies.261 We should not discard or modify that legal
principle, even if the risk of harm is now greater because of the
September 11 attacks, because countries dispassionately and
explicitly considered the elevated risk of harm during war and
emergency when they drafted and ratified the Geneva Conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the Convention against Torture. None of those treaties
permit torture in times of war or emergency, even though their
drafters undoubtedly recognized that in such situations, the
necessity to obtain information would be much greater than in
peacetime or non-emergency periods. We should not modify
that rule because decision makers might reach a different
judgment in the immediate emotional aftermath of a crisis;
both history and social science ought to make us suspicious of
judgments reached in crisis situations that are so fundamentally at odds with the rules people thought ought apply to wartime situations before the crisis eventuated.
There are, of course, occasions when it is appropriate for
the government to take strong, coercive measures. But in almost all of these situations the law permits the government to
take forceful action. For example, Condoleezza Rice and Donald
Rumsfeld maintain that “millions are dead because Britain and
France failed to take preventive military action to thwart the
gathering Nazi threat in the 1930s.”262 But at that time, legal
rules permitted those countries to take military action that
would have stopped Hitler before he could have obtained the
military power he did. When Hitler attacked the Rhineland,
Austria, or Czechoslovakia, Britain and France could have responded in collective self-defense to those attacks without the
need to resort to any doctrine of preventive war. What prevented them from doing so was not international law, but
rather the lack of political will to prepare militarily and forge a
strong alliance with the Soviet Union to counter Hitler’s at261. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, supra note 65, art. 2.
262. RECORD, supra note 52, at 79–80.
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tacks.263 Indeed, Winston Churchill unsuccessfully advocated
the formation of a strong defensive alliance with the Soviet Union and military preparation, and not the initiation of preventive war with Germany.264
Of course, there are hypothetical situations where policymakers may deem coercive preventive measures necessary to
prevent catastrophic harm—as in torture and the ticking bomb
scenario—but the legal rules simply prohibit executive officials
from taking such action. However, real cases that present these
dilemmas are likely to be rare, and as I and other scholars have
written, it is better to force the executive official to violate the
law openly and seek either indemnification or ratification, or
accept punishment for his actions, than to permit officials to
have the legal authority to engage in torture, preventive detention, and preventive war whenever they deem these measures
necessary.265 To provide officials with the legal authority to
take such measures when, in their opinion, emergency so requires is to take us down the path to normalizing those measures.
CONCLUSION
It is not surprising that governments often respond to an
emergency or crisis by resorting to coercive preventive measures. When a danger becomes potentially catastrophic, it seems
to make sense to take strong, aggressive preventive measures
to avoid the danger from eventuating. Similarly, the tendency
of governments to substitute ad hoc balancing for clear rules in
determining which actions to take to resolve a crisis is not irrational. Discarding the clear rules affords government officials
more discretion to take the preventive measures they deem
necessary to meet the crisis.
Yet ironically, the turn toward coercive preventive measures may heighten instead of diminish the risk of the catastrophic danger occurring. In the heat of the crisis, the government
will often fail to accurately consider the risks of the preventive
263. See id. at 79.
264. TUVIA BEN-MOSHE, CHURCHILL: STRATEGY AND HISTORY 108–09
(1992); A.J.P. TAYLOR, CHURCHILL, FOUR FACES AND THE MAN 28–31 (1969);
ALFRED VAGTS, DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY 311 (1956).
265. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent
Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1022–23 (2003); Jules
Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385,
1396–97 (1989).

LOBEL_4FMT

1450

6/1/2007 11:38:48 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:1407

action—risks that not only will imprison innocent people unnecessarily, but that these preventive measures will induce a
reaction that will threaten the very security interests the government seeks to protect.
The Iraq war presents a vivid illustration of these dangers.
A war that was waged ostensibly to prevent terrorists from obtaining access to weapons of mass destruction has created a
terrorist haven in Iraq where none existed before the war.266
The war has spawned a breeding ground for terrorists in Iraq,
inspired more terrorists throughout the world, embroiled the
U.S. Armed Forces in a seemingly unwinnable conflict, and
emboldened other nations such as North Korea and Iran to accelerate their efforts to produce nuclear weapons.267 An April
2006 classified National Intelligence Estimate concluded that
the Iraq war “has made the overall terrorism problem
worse.”268 Similarly a report by Britain’s top intelligence and
law enforcement officials concluded that “[e]vents in Iraq are
continuing to act as motivation and a focus of a range of terrorist related activity in the U.K.”269
The Iraq war as well as the other coercive preventive measures the Bush administration has employed in its war on terrorism thus stand as a cautionary note to those who seek to
rely on ad hoc balancing of competing interests instead of clear
rules to decide to preventively detain individuals, to preventively use coercive interrogation methods to gain information,
or to wage preventive war against other nations. Such preventive actions are often justly condemned by civil libertarians as
undermining our liberty and other values such as peace. Unfortunately, their use can often undermine our security as well.
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